The Origins of the Psychological Experiment
as a Social Institution
Kurt Danziger
(1985)
Originally
published in American Psychologist, 40, 133-140.
©1985 by
the American Psychological Association
Abstract
The psychological experiment involves a set of institutionalized
role patterns that have evolved historically. This evolution can be studied by analyzing
published experimental reports. From the beginning, there were two models for
the social structure of the psychological experiment, the
Whatever else it may be, the psychological experiment is clearly a
social institution that has flourished in certain societies and that implies
patterns of social regulations that closely circumscribe the relationships of
those who participate in it. The investigative situations in which knowledge
about human psychology is gathered are highly institutionalized and involve a
generally accepted distribution of role expectations among the participants, a
clearly understood status differential, and an elaborate set of rules governing
the permissible interactions among the role incumbents.
The sizable literature devoted to various
aspects of the social psychology of the psychological experiment (e.g., Adair,
1973; Jung, 1982; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1975;
Silverman, 1977) has paid virtually no attention to the history of the social
features of the psychological experiment. Apart from Schultz's (1970)
recognition of the fact that there is a history to the use of human subjects in
psychological re- search, there has been no systematic attempt to uncover this
history.
Because the rules of scientific
experimentation prescribe the preparation of a formal account of the proceedings
for publication, the literature in psychological journals contains much
material that throws light on historically changing social practices. Of course,
published experimental articles mainly contain information on the public and
formal aspects of the experimental situation, but it is precisely these aspects
that are of interest in tracing historical changes in institutionalized
patterns.
In pursuing
this kind of analysis the wisest course is to pay special attention to
historical beginnings. It is in the early stages of the growth of a field that
fundamental directions of development are laid down and that traditions are
established that become implicit models for later generations. Historians and
philosophers of science have long recognized this by paying an extraordinary
amount of attention to those 17th century developments that mark the beginning
of modern physical science, even though the scientific production of that
period represents only a tiny fraction of what was accomplished later. In the
case of experimental psychology, the last two decades of the 19th and the first
two decades of the 20th century occupy a similar position.
The material
that provides the basis for the present discussion is drawn from the first half
of this period, a time when the practice of psychological experimentation was
in the process of becoming institutionalized. It involves an analysis of the
procedures reported in all empirical studies published in the major relevant
journals for the period from 1879 to 1898. This includes two German-language journals
(Philosophische
Studien and Zeitschrift
für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane), two French language journals (Revue
philosophique and Année
psychologique), and four English-language journals (Mind, Pedagogical
Seminary, American Journal of Psychology, and Psychological Review).
Incipient Institutionalization
One striking feature that characterized the first half of this
period is the absence of an agreed-upon uniform nomenclature for identifying
the participants in a psychological experiment. Although in the case of Wundt and his first group of students we are dealing with a
research community that was quite sharply defined in terms of goals, methods,
and knowledge of each other's work, there are clearly no strong conventions about
the identification of experimenter and subject roles. In their published
reports, different members of the
Not only are there several alternative
labels for the experimental subject, but there is also no uniformity of usage
within the research community. This becomes particularly striking when two investigators
are concerned with the same type of experimentally established phenomena but
use different terms to refer to their experimental subjects. For example, in an
early investigation of the "time sense," Kollert
(1883) referred to his subjects as reactors, whereas Estel (1885), whose study
followed directly from Kollert's, switched to the
term observers. This
lack of semantic uniformity is also reflected in the fact that some
investigators used two or three terms interchangeably within the same
experimental report to refer to their experimental subjects (e.g., Merkel,
1885).
Echoes of the
The original terminological chaos soon yielded to a very limited number
of accepted terms, as the practice of psychological experimentation established
its own recognized models and institutionalized patterns. By the mid-1890s,
half of the experimental reports in the American Journal of Psychology and
Psychological Reviev used the term subject,
and a quarter preferred observer. Reagent was a distant third,
and all other terms have remained purely idiosyncratic. However, it is worth
noting that the crystallization of routine practice did not involve the adoption
of a single model of usage but of a small number of alternative models.
It took virtually another half century for one model to achieve overwhelming
preponderance. As late as 1930 there was heated discussion about the rival
claims of observer and subject (Bentley, 1929; Dashiell, 1930). The establishment of alternative
terminologies was only a sign of the multimodal development of early experimental
practice that needs to be examined.
Role Structure of the Wundtian
Experiment
In the social
system of the contemporary mainstream experiment the function of serving as a
data source is confined to the subject role, and this function cannot be
combined with theoretical conceptualization, task administration, or
publishing. No such segregation existed in the early stages of psychological experimentation.
Wundt's students frequently alternated with one
another as stimulus administrators and sources of data within the same
experiment. The case of Cattell and Berger has been documented in some detail (Sokal, 1980); another early instance is provided by Lorenz
and Merkel (Lorenz, 1885). Moreover, the person under whose name the published
account of the experiment appeared was not necessarily the one who had played
the experimenter role. For instance, Mehner (1885)
published an article on an experiment in which he had functioned solely as the
subject although two other persons had functioned as experimenters at various
times.
Nor was the
role of functioning as a data source considered incompatible with the function
of theoretical conceptualization. Wundt, who
generally shouldered much of this latter function himself in the
We might also note that the participants in these early
psychological experiments were never strangers to one another. They interacted
outside the laboratory as professor and student, as fellow students, and often
as friends. They clearly saw themselves as engaged in a common enterprise in
which all the participants were regarded as collaborators, including the person
who happened to be functioning as the experimental subject at any particular
time. [p. 135] In fact, when introducing the experimental subjects in their
published reports, authors would sometimes do so not by saying that the
observers (or subjects) were so and so, but by saying "my co-workers (Mitarbeiter)
were," followed by the names (Lange, 1888; Titchener,
1893). This involved a complex set of reciprocal obligations and services, such
as functioning as experimenter and subject for each other.
Although we may analyze the psychological experiment as a miniature
social system, it is far from being hermetically sealed off from broader institutional
and cultural contexts. The social structure of a psychological research
situation cannot be created in a cultural and institutional vacuum but must
make use of whatever material happens to be available at a particular time and
place. The Wundtian program of systematic
psychological research constituted a genuine innovation, but its social features
clearly carried the mark of the institutional context in which it arose. That
context was, of course, the late 19th century German university with its
elitism and its emphasis on active involvement in research for both faculty and
students. Thus, its basic organizational units were not teaching departments,
as in
Experimental Hypnosis as the Alternative
At exactly the same time that Wundt's
The link made between role-playing
in hypnosis and role-playing in the psychological experiment, which ushered in
the period of contemporary concern with the social psychology of the
psychological experiment (Orne, 1962), turns out to
be more than just an analogy. From the point of view of its social psychology
it is the hypnosis experiment rather than the Wundtian
experiment that constitutes the historical prototype of the modern psychology
experiment. By 1890, Binet had turned from
experiments on hypnotized subjects to experiments on infants (Binet, 1890). This was possible without altering the essential
social structure of the experimental situation. For the Wundtian
experiment, on the other hand, this kind of extension of scope was not possible,
and in due course it paid for this limitation by becoming virtually extinct.
As we have
seen, the hypnosis experiment of the 1880s involved a rigid and well-defined
role and status structure from the beginning. What was the origin of this
instant social structure? Very likely, it was the medical context in which
these experiments were carried out. The subjects in these experiments were
essentially a clinical population of hysterics and "somnambulists,"
and the experimenters were for the most part strongly identified with the
medical profession. The experiments themselves arose directly out of ongoing
medical research into the nature of hysteria and hypnosis. Before experimental
sessions began, the experimenter and the subject were already linked in a
doctor-patient relationship, and the essential features of this relationship
were simply continued into the experimental situation. The whole situation was
defined in medical terms. A crucial feature of this definition was the
understanding that the psychological states and phenomena under study were
something that the subject or patient underwent or suffered. This contrasted
quite sharply with the Wundtian experiment in which
most of the phenomena studied were understood as the products of the individual's
activity.
The much less fluid social structure of the hypnosis experiment is
reflected in a high degree of linguistic uniformity in referring to the
participants in the experimental situation. It is in this context that we find
the first consistent usage of the term [p. 136] subject in experimental
psychology. These medically oriented experimenters quite spontaneously referred
to a case they experimented on as a subject (sujet), because that
term had long been in use to designate a living being who
was the object of medical care or naturalistic observation. This usage goes
back at least to Buffon in the 18th century. Before
that a subject was a corpse used for purposes of anatomical dissection,
and by the early 19th century people spoke of patients as being good or bad
subjects for surgery (Grand
Larousse, 1973; Littré, 1968). When hypnosis
came to be seen as an essentially medical matter, which was certainly the case
in Paris in the 1880s, there was nothing more natural than to extend an already
established linguistic usage to yet another object of medical scrutiny However,
within the medical context we immediately get the formulation healthy
subject (sujet
sains) (Féré,
1885, and in the titles of studies by Bremaud and by Bottey cited in Dessoir, 1888) when it is a matter of comparing the
performance of normal and abnormal individuals. From this it is a very short
step to the generalized use of the term subject to refer to any individual
under psychological investigation. This step was quickly taken by Binet and others.
Thus, in the earliest years of experimental psychology there
simultaneously emerged two very different models of the psychological
experiment as a social situation. These can be called the
The occasional English-language studies of this early period were
not the product of a research community as well defined as the
Cattell appears to have been the first to use the English term subject
in describing a psychological experiment involving a normal adult human
data source (Cattell, 1886). However, he was by no means sure of his ground,
for in an 1889 paper coauthored by him we find the formulation an observer
or subject (Cattell & Bryant, 1889), with subject in inverted
commas. Putting the term subject in inverted commas, when used in this
context, was quite common in the English literature of this time (Gurney, 1884,
1887; Gurney, Myers, & Podmore, 1886, pp.
330-331; Jacobs, 1887), indicating that this usage was of recent origin,
possibly influenced by French models. The
English term subject had acquired similar medical connotations as its
French equivalent. In the 18th century it was used to refer to a corpse
employed for anatomical dissection, and by the middle of the 19th century it
could also mean "a person who presents himself for or undergoes medical or
surgical treatment" (Oxford
English Dictionary, 1933, Vol. 10). Hence its use
in the context of hypnosis. It was already used occasionally by James
Braid (e.g., Braid, 1960, p. 209).
American Innovations
By the turn of the century there
were clear signs that American psychology would develop a style of research
that differed in certain fundamental ways from either of the European models.
The most striking feature of this style was the introduction of a new object of
psychological investigation, that of a population of individuals.
In the forms in which it was first
established the psychological experiment involved strictly one-to-one
relationships among the participants. However, there was another possibility.
The recently expanded and bureaucratized educational systems of the economically
advanced countries had produced large captive groups of young people who were
not only a source of new psychological problems but who could also be seen as a
potential source of psychological data. Although there were a few isolated and sporadic
European moves in this direction, the sys- [p. 137] tematic
pursuit of this new style of psychological investigation was initially an
American phenomenon.
A primitive form of the new style was
promoted with considerable early success by G. Stanley Hall. The research
reported in his journal Pedagogical Seminary (founded only 4 years after
the American Journal of Psychology)
differs from other psychological research of the time in several
interesting ways, not the least of which is its predominant focus on psychological
characteristics of populations rather than individuals. Studies are commonly
based on data from hundreds of subjects, and investigations involving thousands
of children are by no means rare (e.g., Barnes, 1895; Kratz,
1896; Schallenberger, 1894).
Obviously, this kind of research involved a very different set of
social relationships than those that characterized the academic laboratories of
the time. The contrast with the
Although the research sponsored by Hall could find much common
ground with emerging work on mental tests, it could be called experimental only
within the loosest definition of that term. Nevertheless, some of the American
experimental literature of the time bears the marks of a similar style (e.g., Baldwin,
Shaw, & Warren, 1895; Griffing, 1895; Jastrow, 1894; Kirkpatrick, 1894). Here the experimental
tasks were administered to children and college students in group sessions, and
the results were presented simply as group averages without any analysis of the
response patterns of individual subjects. This was a striking departure from
the then-established practice of attributing all experimental results to
specific individuals. What emerged was an impersonal style of research in which
experimental subjects played an anonymous role, experimenter-subject contacts
were relatively brief, and the experimenter was interested in the aggregate data
to be obtained from many subjects.
What would be an appropriate label for
this model of experimentation, which clearly differed in important ways from
the other two models? The early investigators themselves sometimes referred to these
as statistical studies. But one hesitates to follow them because within
the
Both conceptually and historically it
makes for greater clarity to distinguish between the forms of statistical
technology and the research practices that provide the context for the
application of this technology. This is not to deny the development of intimate
ties between the two aspects, as indeed happened in the 20th century history of
the Galtonian paradigm. But in terms of the emergence of certain patterns of
social practice in psychological research, we have to consider the research
community most closely identified with this historical process. Pinpointing
such a community in early American psychology is a little more doubtful than in
the European cases that have been discussed. Many American psychologists
engaged in a mixture of practices at that time. However, one major center clearly
overshadowed all others in its systematic employment of new research practices,
not sanctioned by the accepted European models. This was Hall's little empire
at
It seems, then, that psychology entered the 20th century with three
different models for structuring the social interactions that are a necessary
part of its research enterprise. For a few years these models [p. 138] coexisted
relatively peacefully, and occasionally two of them would even appear side by
side in the same research report. But this was not a stable situation. Social
relations in the laboratory were not hermetically sealed off from social
relations outside. The demands of a wider social practice brought changes to
investigative practices and favored some at the expense of others. New forms of
older models and composite models appeared. Sometimes these were associated
with monopolistic claims regarding their ability to provide the only guaranteed
framework for the generation of true and worthwhile psychological knowledge.
However, detailed consideration of these later developments lies outside the
scope of this article.
Implications and Questions
The
distinctions among the patterns of investigative social practice discussed here
show that from its earliest beginnings experimental psychology involved a
structuring of social interaction and that alternative ways of accomplishing
this were always available. An analysis of these original cases suggests
certain general implications.
One of these implications concerns the embeddedness
of social psychological aspects of experimentation in a historically limited
normative framework. For instance, it is not plausible to assume that generalizations
about the social psychology of the subject role in any one of these models
would hold for the other two. Yet, virtually ail of the existing empirical work
in this area tends to take a certain social structure of experimentation for
granted. Although this has some practical justification, the principle of the
historicity of social psychological generalizations (Gergen
& Gergen, 1984) needs to be applied also to the
social psychology of the psychological experiment.
Discussions about the pros and cons of experimentation in psychology
represent another area that might well benefit from a more historically
informed perspective. Such discussions are apt to revolve around something that
is identified as the psychological experiment (e.g., Gadlin
& Ingle, 1975; Kruglanski, 1976). But the
definite article can be misleading in this context. From its beginnings experimental
psychology used more than a single model of the experiment, and the differences
among these models may be of more profound significance than their
similarities. It is true that at certain times and in certain locations a
particular model of experimentation achieved an overwhelming predominance, but
this does not establish the existence of the psychological experiment as an ahistorical entity. Instead of equating a particular form
of experimentation with experimentation as such, we should be asking questions
about the scope and limits of different social patterns of experimentation (Hendrick, 1977).
Another implication concerns the social
contextualization of psychology. We know that the historical development of
psychology cannot be divorced from characteristics of the culture and from structural
features of the wider society within which psychology exists (e.g., Buss,
1979). Usually these influences are thought to operate on the level of conceptual
preferences and theoretical biases. But if psychological ideas are not produced
in a social vacuum, the same holds true of the psychological experiment as a
miniature social system. The social interactions that are necessary for
psychological experimentation were not designed from scratch on the basis of
purely rational considerations but simply grew out of patterns of interaction
that were already familiar to the participants. Medical and educational institutions
provided the original forms of these patterns; just as medical and educational
theories provided the sources of many psychological concepts. Other social
institutions probably became relevant at a later stage. The point is that
methodology is no more free of the influence of social
contextual factors than is the formation of theoretical concepts.
This leads to a third implication, which
concerns the need to relate differences in theoretical position to differences
in the social practice of investigation. We get a one-sided, idealized picture
of the development of psychology if we see it only in terms of changes in
theoretical orientation. Where theoretical differences have been profound, they
have generally been linked to different investigative practices (for an example
from the history of psychology, see Böhme, 1977).
This is true of the cases examined here, but it is equally true of 20th century
cases like psychoanalysis, Gestalt psychology, and behaviorism. Once we have
recognized this we have to resist the temptation of engaging in fruitless
speculation about the chicken and egg problem of the priority of theoretical orientation and the social practices involved
in investigation. What is important is the recognition that psychological
theorizing is not an activity totally divorced from the social relationships that
psychologists establish with those who are the source of their data.
The social situations that characterize
psychological experiments are explicitly designed to function as
knowledge-generating situations. Interactions that lead to the production of
data that count as psychological knowledge are part of what have been called "social
proof structures" (White, 1977). In the examples discussed here, different
patterns of interaction were associated with the production of different kinds
of knowledge. Insofar as this can be generalized it leads to a relativization of questions about experimentation in
psychology As long as such questions [p. 139] are framed in terms of experimentation in general and knowledge
in the abstract, they are likely to remain sterile. A more promising approach would involve
raising questions about relationships between the social structure of knowledge-generating
situations and the nature of their products. In addressing such questions
it would be as well not to ignore the potentially
rich source of evidence buried in the published record of psychologists' past practices.
References
Adair, J. G. (1973). The human subject: The psychology of the
psychology experiment.
Baldwin, J. M., Shaw,
W. J., & Warren, H. C. (1895). Memory for square size. Psychological
Review. 2, 236-244.
Barnes, E. (1895). Punishment
as seen by children. Pedagogical Seminary, 3, 235-245.
Beaunis, H. (1885). L'expérimentation en psychologie par le somnambulisme provoqué
[Psychological experimentation by induced somnambulism]. Revue philosophique. 20,
1-36.
Beaunis, H. (1886). Études physiologiques et psychologiques sur le somnambulsime provoqué [Physiological
and psychological studies on induced somnambulism].
Bentley, M. (1929). "Observer" and "subject" American Journal of
Psychology, 41, 682-683.
Binet, A. (1886). La psychologie du raisonnement: Recherches experimentales par I'hypnotisme [The psychology of reasoning: Experimental
investigations by means of hypnotism].
Binet, A. (1890). Recherches sur les movements chez quelques
jeunes enfants
[Investigations of the motor activity of young children]. Revue philosophique, 29, 297-309.
Binet, A., & Féré, C.
(1885). L'hypnotisme
chez les hysteriques: Le transfert
psychique [Hypnotism with hysterics: Mental transfer].
Revue philosophique, 19, 1-25.
Böhme, G. (1977).
Cognitive norms, knowledge-interests and the constitution of the scientific object:
A case study in the functioning of rules for experimentation. In
Braid, J. (1960). Braid on hypnotism: The beginnings of modern hypnosis.
Bryan, W. L. (1892). The development of voluntary
motor ability. American Journal of Psychology, 5, 123-204.
Buss, A. R (Ed.). (1979). Psychology in social context.
Cattell, J. M. (1886). The time taken up by
cerebral operations. Mind. 11,
220-242.
Cattel, J. M.
(1888). Psychometrische Untersuchungen
III (Psychometric investigations). Philosophische
Studien, 4,
241-250.
Cattell, J. M . (1890).
Mental tests and measurements. Mind, 15, 373-380.
Cattell, J. M., & Bryant, S. (1889). Mental association
investigated by experiment. Mind, 14, 230-250.
Dashiell, J. F (1930). A reply to Professor Bentley. Psychological Review, 37, 183-185.
Danziger, K. (1980). Wundt's
psychological experiment in the light of his philosophy of science. Psychological
Research, 42, 109-122.
Delboeuf, J.
(1886a). La memoire chez les hypnotisés
[Memory in the hypnotized]. Revue philosophique,
21, 441-472.
Delboeuf, J.
(1886b). De l'influence de l'education
et de l'imitation dans le somnambulisme provoqué [The influence of education and of imitation in
induced somnambulism]. Revue philosophique,
22, 146-171.
Dessoir, M. (1888). Bibliographie des Hypnotismus
[Bibliography of hypnotism].
Dietze, G. (1885).
Untersuchungen über den Umfang des Bewusstseins bei regelmassig auf einander folgenden Schalleindrücken [Investigations on the range of
consciousness with auditory sensations in regular sequence]. Philosophische Studien,
2, 362-393.
Estel, V. (1885). Neue Versuche
iiber den Zeitsinn [New
experiments on the time sense]. Philosophische
Studien, 2, 37-65.
Féré, C. (1885). Sensation et mouvement [Sensation and movement]. Review philosophique, 20, 337-368.
Friedrich, M. (1883). Über die Apperceptionsdauer
bei einfachen und zusammengesetzten Vorstellungen
[On the duration of apperception with simple and compound ideas]. Philosophische Studien.
1, 39-77.
Gadlin, H., & Ingle G. (1975). Through the one-way mirror: The limits of experimental self reflection.
American Psychologist, 30,
1003-1009.
Gergen, K. J., & Gergen,
M. (Eds.). (1984). Historical
social psychology.
Grand Larousse de
la langue Française. (1973). (vol. 6).
Griffing, H. (1895). On the development of visual
perception and attention. American Journal of Psychology, 7, 227-236.
Gurney, E. (1884). The stages of hypnotism. Mind, 9,
110-121.
Gurney, E. (1887). Further problems of hypnotism. Mind, 12,
212-222.
Gurney, E., Myers, E .W.
H., & Podmore, E. (1886). Phantasms of the living (2 vols).
Hall, G. S. (1883). Reaction
time and attention in the hypnotic state. Mind, 8, 170-182.
Hall, G. S., & Donaldson,
H. H. (1885). Motor sensations
on the skin. Mind. 10, 557-572.
Hall, G. S., & Jastrow, J. (1886). Studies of rhythm. Mind, 11, 55-62.
Hall, G. S., & Motora, Y. (1887). Dermal sensitiveness to gradual pressure changes. American
Journal of Psychology, 1, 72-98.
Hendrick, C. (1977). Role-taking role playing and the laboratory experiment.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 3, 467-478.
Jacobs, J. (1887). Experiments
on "prehension." Mind,
12. 75-79.
Jastrow, J. (1894). Community and association of ideas: A statistical study. Psychological
Review, 1, 152-158.
Jung, J. (1982). The experimenter's
challenge: Methods and issues in psychological research.
Kirkpatrick, E. A. (1894). An experimental study of memory. Psychological Review, 1,
602-609.
Kollert, J. (1883). Untersuchungen über den Zeitsinn [Investigations
on the time sense]. Philosophische Studien, 1, 78-89.
Kratz, H. C. ( 1896). Characteristics
of the best teacher as recognized by children. Pedagogical Seminary, 3, 413-418.
Kruglanski, A. W. (1976). On the paradigmatic objections to experimental
psychology. American Psychologist, 31, 655-663.
Lange, L. (1888). Neue
Experimente über den Vorgang der einfachen
Reaction auf Sinneseindrücke [New experiments on the
process of simple reaction to sensory impressions]. Philosophische
Studien, 4,
497-510.
Littré, E. (1968). Dictionaire de la
langue Française [Dictionary of the French
language, vol. 7].
Lorenz, G. (1885). Die Methode der richtigen
und falschen Fälle in ihrer Anwendung auf Schallempfindungen [The method of right and wrong cases
applied to auditory sensations]. Philosophische
Studien, 2, 394-474.
Mehner, M. (1885). Zur Lehre vom Zeitsinn
[On the doctrine of the time sense]. Philosophische
Studien, 2, 546-602.
Merkel, J. (1885). Die Zeitlichen Verhältnisse der Willensthätigkeit
[p. 140] [Temporal relationships of volitional activity]. Philosophische
Studien, 2,
73-127.
Orne, M, T (1962). On the social psychology of the psychological experiment:
With particular reference to demand characteristics and their implications. American
Psychologist, 17, 776-783.
Richet, C, (1879). De l'influence
des mouvements sur les idées [On the influence of movements on ideas]. Revue philosophique, 8, 610-615.
Richet, C. (1880). Du somnambulisme provoqué [On induced somnambulism].
Revue philosophique, 10, 337-374;
462-493.
Rosenthal, R.,
& Rosnow, R. L, (Eds.), (1975). The volunteer subject.
Schallenberger, M. (1894). A
study of children's rights as seen by themselves. Pedagogical
Seminary, 3. 87-96.
Schultz, D. P (1970). The nature of the human data source in psychology. In D. P
Schultz (Ed.), The science of psychology: Critical reflections (pp.
77-86).
Silverman,
Sokal, M. (Ed.). (1980). An education in psychology: James McKeen Cattell's journal and
letters from
Stevens, L. T.
(1886). On the time sense. Mind, 11, 393-404.
Tischer, E. (1883). Ueber die Unterscheidung von Schallstärken [On the discrimination of auditory volume]. Philosophische Studien,
1, 495-542.
Titchener, E. B. (1893). Zur Chronometrie des Erkennungsactes [The
chronometry of the act of recognition]. Philosophische
Studien, 8, 138-144.
Trautscholdt, M. (1883). Experimentelle Untersuchungen über die Association der Vorstellungen [Experimental investigations on the
association of ideas]. Philosophische Studien, 1, 213-250.
White, S.
(1977). Social proof structures: The dialectic of method and theory in the work
of psychology. In N. Datan & H. W. Reese (Eds.), Life-span
developmental psychology: Dialectical perspectives on experimental research (pp.
59-92).